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UNDERSTANDING OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY 
AND SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGE: THE ROLE OF 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
KIRSTEN FOSS* and NICOLAI J. FOSS
Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration, and Center for Strategic Management and 
Globalization, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
To add insight in new value creation, opportunity discovery should be integrated with stra-
tegic management theory. Based on the resource-based view and the economics of property 
rights, we build a framework that accomplishes this. Our key argument is that property rights 
and transaction costs are important antecedents of opportunity discovery. We identify two 
mechanisms that establish this infl uence and examine alternative ways in which knowledge, 
transaction costs, and property rights infl uence opportunity discovery and sustainable advan-
tage. Copyright © 2008 Strategic Management Society.
INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 1874, United States Patent No. 
157,124 was granted to Joseph Glidden of DeKalb, 
Ill., for improved barbed wire fencing. Glidden’s 
patent was the culmination of a series of nine patents 
for improvements to wire fencing that were granted 
by the U.S. Patent Offi ce to American inventors, 
beginning with Michael Kelly in November 1868 
and ending with Glidden’s patent (McCallum and 
McCallum, 1965), which quickly became domi-
nant. To be sure, wire fencing had been used for a 
very long time. However, property rights over live-
stock were less secure, as wire fencing would often 
break under the impact of heavy livestock pressing 
against the fencing. This would not happen with 
barbed wire, so the costs at which property rights to 
livestock could be protected fell dramatically 
(Dennen, 1976; Anderson and Hill, 2004).
The new fencing innovation set in motion dramatic 
path-dependent processes of institutional, organiza-
tional, and technological innovations throughout the 
plains. Indeed, it has been argued that the emergence 
of barbed wire was as important a factor behind 
changing life on the plains as the rifl e, telegraph, 
and locomotive (Webb, 1931; Hill, 1969). Argu-
ably, barbed wire was the crucial factor underly-
ing the transformation from ranching to farming, as 
the new fencing protected crops from livestock and 
meant that fi elds could be used as pasture after the 
harvest. Barbed wire ended the great cattle drives 
and the need for branding. Cattle could be kept in 
a limited area, which greatly increased the value to 
agricultural fi rms (farms) of this resource (Webb, 
1931). It prompted experimentation with new, more 
valuable, resources—notably the Shorthorn, Angus, 
and Hereford—as substitutes for the tougher (but 
less valuable) Longhorn, as well as with the uses 
of land.
This example implies that resources (e.g., land) 
hold a number of potential uses, characteristics, etc., 
and that some of these attributes may not yet have 
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been discovered. Changes in the (transaction) costs 
of defi ning and enforcing property rights—induced 
by technological or legal changes or brought about 
by entrepreneurs themselves—alert entrepreneurs to 
the discovery of new potentially valuable resource 
attributes. Such discoveries may translate into sus-
tainable advantages. We integrate these implications 
with strategic management theory, providing a novel 
theoretical account of opportunity discovery and the 
competitive implications thereof. We build on the 
resource-based notion of fi rms as bundles of hetero-
geneous resources (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 1991), 
but place this notion in a dynamic context (Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003). The full set of resource attri-
butes is not known a priori, so these attributes must 
be discovered (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Denrell, 
Fang, and Winter, 2003). The fundamental argument 
of this article is that such discovery is infl uenced by 
transaction costs.
Two mechanisms link transaction costs and 
opportunity discovery. The fi rst mechanism—the 
appropriability mechanism—is the one implied by 
the above example: transaction costs determine how 
well defi ned and enforced property rights to resource 
attributes are. This infl uences the value that entrepre-
neurial resource owners expect to appropriate and, 
therefore, their incentives to engage in opportunity 
discovery (Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005). Second, 
entrepreneurial experience infl uences opportunity 
discovery (e.g., Shane, 2000). However, experience 
also emerges from resource learning (that is, entre-
preneurs’ learning about the attributes of resources) 
(Mahoney, 1995). Such learning entails transac-
tion costs—the costs of measuring the productivity 
potential of employees, for example. The transaction 
costs that entrepreneurs face infl uence their resource 
learning, introduce path dependence in such learning 
(Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Argyres and Mayer, 
2007), and therefore infl uence which opportunities 
will be discovered. We call this the resource learn-
ing mechanism. Both mechanisms imply that the 
level and direction of opportunity discovery is infl u-
enced by transaction costs.
This article is located in the intersection of the 
economics of property rights (EPR) and the resource-
based view (RBV), an emerging theoretical lens in 
strategic management research (e.g., Teece, 1986; 
Mahoney, 1992; Chi, 1994; Oxley, 1999; Foss and 
Foss, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2002, 2005, 2006). 
The argument that transaction costs and experi-
ence impact opportunity discovery contributes to 
the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Kirzner, 1973; 
Shane, 2000; Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005), for 
example, by suggesting answers to key issues in 
the entrepreneurship literature concerning the emer-
gence and locus of entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Moreover, links 
are forged with the strategic management literature: 
We explore how opportunity discovery may translate 
into sustained heterogeneity and, thereby, respond to 
recent calls in the strategy literature for understand-
ing rent creation as a dynamic process (e.g., Helfat 
and Peteraf, 2003; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a, 
2003b) and for integrating opportunity discovery 
with the RBV (e.g., Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; 
Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b).
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND 
EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Opportunity discovery
Opportunity (or entrepreneurial) discov-
ery consists of actions initiated by individuals 
(Schumpeter, 1911; Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2000) or 
teams (Penrose, 1959; Kor, 2003) directed at identi-
fying a hitherto neglected opportunity. An opportu-
nity is a situation ‘.  .  .  in which new goods, services, 
raw materials, and organizing methods can be intro-
duced and sold at a price greater than their cost of 
production’ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000: 220). 
Opportunity discovery may consist of the discov-
ery of new resource attributes or features of orga-
nization that help serve market needs and wants 
in a better way (Schumpeter, 1911). For example, 
individuals or fi rms that introduce new improved 
contractual designs, sorting systems, organization 
structures, etc., may realize an entrepreneurial return 
based on the lowering of transaction costs. Oppor-
tunity discovery may result in the formation of 
new fi rms (e.g., Knight, 1921; Ardichivili, Cardozo 
and Ray, 2003), or may take place inside existing 
fi rms (e.g., Miller, 1983), or may not involve fi rms 
at all (Kirzner, 1973). Although entrepreneurship 
may have destructive consequences (Baumol, 1990), 
the focus is here on value-creating opportunity 
discovery.1
1
 Note that although we link up with the discovery branch 
of entrepreneurship, there are other, arguably more radical, 
notions of entrepreneurship, aptly called creation views by 
Alvarez and Barney (2007).
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To some writers (notably Kirzner, 1973, 1997), 
the discovery of opportunities is costless, and the 
search, discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities are essentially one process. To us, in 
contrast, opportunity discovery requires signifi cant 
knowledge, effort, and investment, and it makes 
analytical sense to distinguish different phases in 
the opportunity discovery process. Nevertheless, the 
relevant phases are strongly overlapping, as stressed 
in much recent creativity research (e.g., Finke, Ward 
and Smith, 1992; Runco and Chand, 1995). This 
overlap implies that opportunity discovery may be 
understood as a continuous interplay between the 
phases, the generation of candidate ideas constantly 
interacting with evaluation. Except for cases of pure 
arbitrage, opportunity discovery implies that entre-
preneurs have to engage in speculation concern-
ing the appropriable value that will result from the 
discovery (Knight, 1921; Kaish and Gilad, 1991; 
Eckardt and Shane, 2003; Lippman and Rumelt, 
2003b; Denrell et al., 2003).
Experiential knowledge
An infl uential view in the entrepreneurship litera-
ture is that opportunity discovery depends critically 
on the alertness of the entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1973; 
Busenitz, 1996; Shane, 2003). The recent opportunity 
discovery literature concentrates on operationalizing 
alertness and identifying its antecedents, concentrat-
ing on expected rewards and prior, mainly experi-
ential, knowledge (Busenitz, 1996; Venkataraman, 
1997; Krueger, 2000; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; 
Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Shane, 2000, 2003). In the 
literature, experiential knowledge is taken to include 
such things as prior knowledge about markets, prior 
knowledge about how to serve markets, prior knowl-
edge of customer problems, etc. (e.g., Shane, 2000). 
This emphasis harmonizes with recent fi rm-level 
work on opportunity discovery (usually conceptual-
ized as innovativeness) and its experiential antecen-
dents (Helfat, 1997; Mosakowski, 1998; Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2000; Matsusaka, 2001; Mitchell et al., 
2002; Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005). However, 
in this literature, experiential knowledge concerns 
the understanding of the uses, functionalities, ser-
vices, characteristics, etc., of fi rm resources—that 
is, knowledge of resource attributes (Foss and Foss, 
2005). Such knowledge emerges from resource 
learning (Penrose, 1959; Mahoney, 1995), that is, 
human resources learning about the services of other 
(human and nonhuman) resources.
The outcome of resource learning is experiential 
knowledge that in turn infl uences opportunity discov-
ery. Experiential knowledge infl uences opportunity 
discovery for several reasons. Entrepreneurs need to 
categorize and describe items (specifi cally items that 
can serve as an indication of an opportunity) in a rel-
evant information domain, in order to build a work-
able representation of that domain that can assist 
them in opportunity discovery. People who work 
in ill structured decision situations—such as those 
that characterize opportunity discovery (Knight, 
1921)—require a representation that identifi es and 
even amplifi es relevant information so as to allow 
them to discover discrepancies between the world 
and the representation that is used as an action guide 
(Walsh, 1995; Gaglio and Katz, 2001). Experiential 
knowledge shapes the building of categories and 
representations that assist entrepreneurs in decision 
making (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Abelson and Black, 
1986; Day and Lord, 1992; Gaglio and Katz, 2001). 
A deep level of expertise within a certain infor-
mation domain allows people to faster categorize 
ill structured problems. Also, deep knowledge may 
provide an entrepreneur with more detailed ways 
of understanding and describing his/her resources 
(Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Rensch, Heffner, 
and Duffy, 1994), and thereby assist the discovery 
of new resource attributes.
Experiential knowledge from resource learning is 
fundamental in the initial phase of venture forma-
tion. Here, entrepreneurs may only be able to iden-
tify some elements of an opportunity, so they need to 
invoke imagination and search for and process infor-
mation in order to more fully identify and evaluate the 
opportunity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Ardichvili 
et al., 2003). Moreover, the knowledge that entre-
preneurs or entrepreneurial teams (Penrose, 1959; 
Kor, 2003) acquire through resource learning may 
infl uence their knowledge structures in ways that 
enable them to identify opportunities faster or more 
consistently within a particular information domain 
(e.g., relating to a particular bundle of resources) 
than those who do not posses this particular knowl-
edge (Shane, 2000; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Thus, 
experiential knowledge from resource learning may 
also underlie path-dependent trajectories of discov-
ery in established fi rms (Helfat, 1994; Helfat and 
Raubitschek, 2000), and be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage for such fi rms (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Mahoney, 1995).
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Cognition and incentives in 
opportunity discovery
The emphasis on experiential knowledge in the 
entrepreneurship literature represents a cognitive 
focus on opportunity discovery: The main emphasis 
is on the discovery part, and the actual evaluation 
and eventual seizing of an opportunity, including 
the appropriation of returns, is often less emphasized 
(cf. Kirzner, 1973, 1997). This neglect is potentially 
misleading, because cognitive science implies that 
there is a strong and ongoing process of feedback 
from evaluation to discovery (cf. Finke et al., 1992, 
Runco and Chand, 1995). In other words, expec-
tations of returns from opportunities infl uence the 
discovery process itself, infl uencing the intensity 
with which opportunities will be pursued and the 
directions discovery efforts will take. For example, 
entrepreneurs or fi rms may well possess the expe-
riential knowledge that enables their scanning of 
certain emerging technological fi elds in search of 
discoveries. However, if expected returns in some 
of these fi elds are highly uncertain because of weak 
enforcement of property rights to discoveries within 
the fi eld, this may negatively impact discovery 
efforts (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Expected returns 
are infl uenced by assessments of the costs at which 
property rights to discoveries can be delineated and 
enforced (and possibly exchanged). These costs are 
transaction costs. For example, if transaction costs 
are suffi ciently large, they may provide a powerful 
disincentive to discovery. This indicates that explor-
ing the role of transaction costs and property rights 
in the process of opportunity discovery is worth-
while. It will help provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the antecedents of opportunity 
discovery.
LINKING TRANSACTION COSTS 
AND OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY: 
APPROPRIABILITY AND RESOURCE 
LEARNING MECHANISMS
Transaction costs have seldom been explicitly 
related to opportunity discovery, and there is little 
or no theoretical or empirical work that systemati-
cally explores the relation (but see Michael, 2007, 
for a transaction cost analysis of the marketing side 
of entrepreneurial ventures). The following discus-
sion conceptualizes the two mechanisms that link 
transaction costs and opportunity discovery—the 
appropriability mechanism and the resource 
learning mechanism. We make use of the economics 
of property rights (EPR) to frame the discussion.
Attributes and opportunity discovery
The EPR begins from the notion that most resources 
have multiple attributes (Coase, 1960; Cheung, 
1970; Barzel, 1997; Demsetz, 1988), including the 
different functionalities and services/uses (Penrose, 
1959) that the resources can offer. For example, a 
copying machine is a multiattribute resource in the 
sense that it can be used in different time periods 
by many different persons for many different types 
of copying work, and can be purchased in different 
colors, sizes, etc. Building on the EPR, Foss and 
Foss (2005) argue that the understanding of resource 
value is improved by conceptualizing resources as 
bundles of attributes to which property rights may 
be delineated, enforced, and exchanged. This builds 
on the recognition that it is not resources them-
selves that are valuable, but their attributes. Under-
standing attributes and the extent to which property 
rights can be delineated, enforced, and exchanged 
adds increased insight into resource value and value 
appropriation.
Adopting an attributes perspective not only yields 
additional insight into resource value and value 
appropriation, but it also links opportunity discov-
ery and resources. Thus, opportunity discovery may 
be conceptualized in terms of the discovery of new 
valued resource attributes. Individual resources may 
have a multitude of undiscovered attributes, some of 
which may be associated with appropriable value 
(Demsetz, 1988; Denrell et al., 2003). A determinant 
of the appropriable value from newly discovered 
resource attributes is whether the discoverer can 
delineate and enforce property rights to his/her new 
discovery. In turn, this depends on the transaction 
cost of delineating and enforcing property rights.
The appropriability mechanism
A crucial insight of the EPR is that transactions 
involve the exchange of property rights rather than 
the exchange of goods per se (Coase, 1960, 1988). 
Hence, the unit of analysis in this perspective is the 
individual property right. Property rights consist of 
the right to consume, obtain income from, and alien-
ate resource attributes (Alchian, 1965). The EPR 
dissociates property rights from legal connotations, 
so that an (economic) property right is more about 
the actual ability of an agent to consume, obtain 
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income from, and alienate resource attributes than 
to whether he/she is legally entitled to do so. That 
is, it is about effective control (cf. Barzel, 1997). 
(Obviously, however, such ability is likely to be 
infl uenced by the extent to which property rights 
are legally enforceable). In this perspective, trans-
action costs can be defi ned in a consistent manner, 
namely as the costs of delineating, enforcing, and 
exchanging property rights (Coase, 1960; Barzel, 
1997). Property rights may be enforced by the state 
as well as by private means (Barzel, 1997), as in the 
case of the barbed wire example. When rights are 
perfectly enforced, owners can completely hinder 
nonpayers from taking possession of, imitating, or 
consuming any resource attributes that they hold 
property rights to. That is, property rights and their 
enforcement infl uence the value entrepreneurs can 
appropriate from exploration of different resource 
attributes.
Given that discovery and evaluation of opportu-
nities are closely intertwined processes, transaction 
costs infl uence which attributes will be subject to 
discovery. Thus, the perceived cost of delineating 
and enforcing property rights to newly discovered 
attributes are likely to infl uence discovery efforts in 
predictable directions. As a general matter, ‘.  .  .  entre-
preneurial energy and innovation are starkly biased 
toward the creation of those surpluses which can 
be appropriated by the innovator’ (Lippman and 
Rumelt, 2003a: 924; our emphasis; cf. also Shep-
herd and DeTienne, 2005). This link between trans-
action costs and discovery is the appropriability 
mechanism.
To illustrate, consider the barbed wire example 
that introduced this article. Prior to the advent of 
barbed wire, the cost of enforcing property rights to 
cattle and land were such that ranchers did not seri-
ously consider experimenting with introducing the 
Shorthorn, Angus, and Hereford on the plains. The 
cost of enforcing property rights to these attributes 
of land and cattle were prohibitive. The changing 
property rights structure implied by the advent of 
barbed wire had the effect of drastically lowering 
enforcement cost, changing the space for opportunity 
discovery. As another example, the 1980 Supreme 
Court decision in Diamond versus Chakrabarty 
implied a signifi cant removal of uncertainty with 
respect to the law in biotechnology patenting. This 
drastically changed the appropriability regime con-
fronting a number of industries (Pisano, 1990), and 
made exploring genetic engineering and its uses in 
these industries substantially more attractive. The 
relevant space of potential opportunity discovery 
was expanded as a result of the delineation and 
enforcement of property rights to biotech research 
results.
Property rights to resource attributes (or bundles of 
attributes) are seldom perfectly enforced, as owners 
face transaction costs of delineating and protecting 
property rights to such attributes. Some resource 
attributes will optimally not be protected against 
nonpayers’ attempts at appropriating value gener-
ated by the attributes (Barzel, 1997). For example, 
resources are not likely to be completely protected 
against imitation; contracts may not completely safe-
guard against holdup; supermarkets do not monitor 
and price the parking spaces they offer customers 
(effectively inviting nonowners to capture these 
attributes); etc. Such imperfect protection of prop-
erty rights to valuable attributes gives rise to capture 
by nonowners in ways that dissipate value. Capture 
takes many forms. While value erosion from imita-
tion (Barney, 1991) may be the relevant mechanism 
of capture in the case of the biotechnology example 
above, the barbed wire example suggests other, more 
direct, kinds of capture of property rights in the form 
of theft. Another example is holdup (Williamson, 
1996). However, the underlying logic is the same: 
property rights to certain resource attributes are cap-
tured, and the victim is not compensated (Barzel, 
1997). Note in passing that an implication of this 
reasoning is that the reduction of transaction costs by 
means of new ways of delineating (e.g., better ways 
of measuring attributes), protecting (e.g., improved 
protection of business secretes, better ways of pro-
tecting credit card information in virtual exchanges, 
barbed wire, etc.), and exchanging (e.g., introducing 
internet trade) property rights may constitute entre-
preneurial opportunities.
In sum, the appropriability mechanism implies 
that transaction costs help defi ne the relevant space 
for opportunity discovery: the transaction costs 
of enforcing property rights to newly discovered 
resource attributes moderate the relation between 
experiential knowledge and opportunity discovery 
by infl uencing the distribution of perceived costs 
and benefi ts in the space of discoveries.
The resource learning mechanism
While experiential knowledge matters to the dis-
covery of opportunities, building such knowledge is 
costly. Resource learning may imply experimenting 
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with resources, combining and recombining them, and 
learning about their attributes in the process (Penrose, 
1959; Orr, 1996). Thus, resource learning emerges 
from M&As (Matsusaka, 2001), the ramp-up and 
calibration of factory production (Foss, 2001; Stieg-
litz and Heine, 2007), interaction between employees 
and managers (Argote, 1999), and other processes 
that result in the discovery of new resource attributes. 
These processes are costly, and some of the relevant 
costs are transaction costs, such as the costs of nego-
tiating MandAs, contracting (and recontracting) over 
resource uses in strategic alliances, delineating deci-
sion rights over corporate resources inside the fi rm, 
building information revelation mechanisms that can 
reveal the relevant types of human capital, etc. While 
no direct estimates of the transaction costs of resource 
learning appear to exist, there are reasons to believe 
that such costs are often substantial. For instance, 
think of expenses for corporate lawyers in connec-
tion with M&As or the recruitment costs of hiring 
new employees.
To further exemplify, consider the problem of 
how to design and coordinate a system of productive 
tasks with many task complementarities. Designers 
are not likely to have full knowledge ex ante about, 
for example, the optimal sequencing of tasks, even 
if they know the functionalities of physical resources 
perfectly. For example, the problem of defi ning an 
optimal sequence of tasks in a complex system of 
production may require more calculation capacity 
than is available in a supercomputer (Galloway, 
1996). Some kind of experimental, iterative learn-
ing process is then required to solve the problem. 
In a world of complete knowledge, perfect rational-
ity, and zero transaction cost, all rights to all uses 
of all assets could be perfectly specifi ed ex ante in 
contracts; there would be no need to learn about 
resource attributes. However, in a more realistic 
setting, understanding the various ways in which 
tasks may be sequenced, the physical equipment 
used, etc., requires an iterative process of specifying 
resource attributes and trying out solutions. Costs of 
defi ning resource uses, measuring the productivity 
of resources, coordinating uses, etc., are incurred. If 
these costs are very high, it may only pay to perform 
a few iterations before a solution is decided upon. 
Little experiential knowledge is built concerning 
the properties of the production system. In contrast, 
lower costs may lead to faster and more resource 
learning, and a solution that is closer to the optimum. 
In sum, transaction costs directly infl uence resource 
learning processes because the expected gains will 
be balanced against the (transaction and other) costs 
of resource learning.
OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY AND 
SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGE: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Benchmarks
While experiential knowledge, the appropriability 
mechanism, and the resource learning mechanism 
add insight into opportunity discovery, do they 
also infl uence how and to what extent opportunity 
discovery translates into sustainable advantage? 
Moreover, while experiential learning and the two 
mechanisms have so far been treated separately, it 
seems warranted to consider the realistic situations 
where they interact.
To examine these issues in greater detail, we make 
use of (unrealistic) benchmark situations where the 
effects of experiential knowledge, the appropriabil-
ity mechanism, and the resource learning mechanism 
on opportunity discovery and advantage are nulli-
fi ed. The analysis is then complicated by sequen-
tially switching on experiential knowledge and the 
two mechanisms. The purpose of this exercise is to 
be able to more clearly study the effects on certain 
dependent variables (e.g., opportunity discovery) 
of certain independent variables (e.g., transaction 
costs), eliminating other infl uences. Thus, one can 
consider the direct effects of the independent vari-
ables as a precursor to understanding combined or 
interaction effects.
Such thought experiments are commonplace in 
economics (see Hahn [1973] for a methodological 
explication and defence of its use), and are also some-
times used by management scholars. For example, 
Barney (1991) begins his exposition of the RBV by 
analyzing what will happen to sustained competitive 
advantages in a setting where fi rms control identical 
resource bundles, then gradually introduces anteced-
ents of sustained competitive advantage to fi nally 
arrive at the full set of jointly necessary conditions 
for such advantage. Thus, Barney begins from an 
extreme benchmark and gradually relaxes the con-
straining assumptions, introducing greater realism.
We specifi cally ask how property rights/transac-
tion costs and knowledge separately and interac-
tively infl uence opportunity discovery and sustained 
advantage. The result is a clearer understanding of 
the operation of the mechanisms that are at work. The 
independent variables we consider as determinants 
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of opportunity discovery and sustained advantage 
are property rights, transaction costs, and (experi-
ential) knowledge. We abstract from other poten-
tially relevant independent variables, for example, 
risk preferences, personality traits, network position, 
etc.
Blueprint technology. Two analytical devices are 
used to characterize the benchmarks. The fi rst one 
is that of blueprint technology (Robinson, 1933; 
Demsetz, 1991), that is, the assumption that knowl-
edge that can be used by any one entrepreneur can 
also be used by any other entrepreneur. In the sim-
plest versions of production theory in economics 
(Robinson, 1933), productive knowledge is a pure 
public good, that is, it is nonrivalrous in use and it 
is impossible to exclude any nonpayers. We do not 
adopt this extreme assumption. As understood here, 
blueprint knowledge means only that the transfer of 
knowledge is not impeded by imperfect and differen-
tial absorptive capacity on the part of entrepreneurs. 
It may be possible to exclude nonpayers depending 
on the (transaction) costs of doing so. The opposite 
of blueprint technology is that knowledge exchange 
and transfer among entrepreneurs is limited because 
of absorptive capacity gaps.
Zero transaction costs. The second device we 
make use of is the zero transaction cost setting intro-
duced by Coase (1960). Coase (1988) and Barzel 
(1997) argue that the assumption of zero transac-
tion costs means that property rights to all valuable 
resource attributes are perfectly delineated, enforced, 
and exchanged at zero cost. At issue, however, is what 
is meant by all valuable resource attributes. Coase 
(1988) interprets the zero-cost condition as implying 
omniscience, so that zero transaction costs literally 
mean that all resource attributes (including all future 
resource uses) are known to decision makers. In such 
a setting, there is, of course, no scope for opportu-
nity discovery (Denrell et al., 2003). However, other 
writers, with whom we side, argue that opportunity 
discovery can take place even if transaction costs are 
zero: that existing transactions are costless to transact 
does not logically imply that all potential transactions 
have been discovered (cf. Kirzner, 1973). Accord-
ingly, the zero transaction cost condition does not 
rule out opportunity discovery that is rooted in pri-
vately held experiential knowledge (cf. Makowski 
and Ostroy, 2001). However, it does rule out costs 
of writing and enforcing contracts involving knowl-
edge transactions. That is, only differences in absorp-
tive capacity may impede knowledge transactions 
when transaction costs are zero. Moreover, in the 
zero transaction cost benchmark, the appropriability 
mechanism and the resource learning mechanism are 
eliminated in the sense that transaction costs cannot 
be antecedents of opportunity discovery under this 
benchmark.
Four cases. The two benchmark situations can 
now be applied to generate four cases, depending 
on whether we switch on or switch off transaction 
costs and knowledge. Specifi cally, we consider 
four combinations of the determinants of opportu-
nity discovery and sustainable advantage. These are 
zero transaction costs, blueprint knowledge; zero 
transaction costs, nonblueprint knowledge; positive 
transaction costs, blueprint knowledge; and positive 
transaction costs, nonblueprint knowledge. For each 
one of these combinations, we discuss the nature 
of discoverable opportunities, value creation and 
appropriation, the role of opportunity discovery in 
creating resource heterogeneity, and the organiza-
tion of opportunity discovery and exploitation. We 
focus on these dependent variables because they are 
crucially important in entrepreneurship and strategic 
management research (see Table 1).
Case A: zero transaction costs and 
blueprint knowledge
Opportunity discovery. Kirzner (1973) argues that 
even in the model of the market of economics text-
books, there is a need for the entrepreneur as an equil-
ibrating force. This textbook model is one in which 
transaction costs are zero and where knowledge is 
blueprint. Even in this extreme case, opportunity 
discovery can take place, namely in the form of the 
discovery of new resource attributes and resource 
learning (recall that there is no assumption here that 
entrepreneurs are omniscient). The entrepreneur’s 
incentives to engage in opportunity discovery and 
resource learning arise from the discrepancies in 
earnings from exploiting resource attributes that 
he/she has already discovered and exploiting newly 
discovered attributes. However, neither transac-
tion costs nor barriers to knowledge utilization will 
infl uence which resource attributes entrepreneurs 
discover. Property rights can be delineated and 
enforced at zero cost, which eliminates all concerns 
of capture, including capture from imitation. This 
nullifi es the appropriability mechanism. Also, there 
are no transaction costs that hinder resource learn-
ing; this mechanism, too, is nullifi ed.
Value creation and appropriation. The zero 
transaction cost assumption and the assumption 
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that prior knowledge can be fully absorbed by any 
entrepreneur imply that any value-creating discov-
ery will be utilized to its full economic capacity 
(i.e., where the marginal net benefi t from further 
utilization is zero) (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001). 
Over time, total value creation will be maximized 
because of the absence of transaction costs and bar-
riers to knowledge absorption. While value creation 
will be independent of bargaining power (cf. the 
Coase Theorem, Coase, 1960), bargaining power 
will determine how much value entrepreneurs and 
factor owners will appropriate. Specifi cally, how 
much value an entrepreneur who makes a discovery 
can appropriate depends on the bargaining game 
among the entrepreneur, those who benefi t from the 
discovery, and those who hold property rights to 
complementary resources that are needed to exploit 
the discovery (cf. Teece, 1986). There is no a priori 
reason to impute all or even the largest amount of 
the created value to the entrepreneur.
Path dependence and sustainable heterogene-
ity. Entrepreneurs may start out with heterogeneous 
bundles of resources attributes which result in hetero-
geneous resource learning. However, as there are no 
transaction costs of selling knowledge and no barri-
ers to absorbing knowledge, no entrepreneur will be 
locked into a path of inferior resource learning and 
opportunity discovery: best-practice knowledge can 
be purchased at factor markets. In fact, other kinds 
of path dependence are also ruled out by virtue of 
the zero transaction cost condition, as optimal solu-
tions will always be negotiated when there are no 
obstacles (i.e., transaction costs) to doing so. Thus, 
no strategic issues relating to lock in to inferior 
products or technical solutions can arise.
The other side of the coin is that long-lasting 
resource heterogeneity among entrepreneurs cannot 
be an outcome of initial knowledge endowments 
or opportunity discovery, because all knowledge 
and all discoveries will be made available on the 
relevant factor markets. When entrepreneurs hold 
secure property rights to the discoveries they make, 
they will be best off by letting others share in 
the discovery (against compensation). Factor 
Table 1. Four cases
Opportunity 
discovery (OD)
Value creation and 
appropriation
Path-dependence/
heterogeneity
Economic 
organization
Case A: zero 
transaction costs 
(TC), blueprint 
knowledge
All opportunities 
will be fully 
exploited
The two condtions 
imply that value 
creation will be 
maximum. Value 
will be split solely 
according to 
bargaining powers
None—as 1) all 
knowledge that can be 
profi tably traded will 
be traded, and 2) all 
ineffi ciencies can be 
traded away
Spot market 
contracting 
can handle all 
transactions/no 
rationale for fi rms
Case B: zero 
transaction costs, 
nonblueprint 
knowledge
Knowledge 
will accumulate 
differently and 
this will impact 
OD. Less OD than 
under A
Less value creation 
than under A, since 
some knowledge will 
not be fully exploited
Yes because of, 
imperfect absorptive 
capacity
Clusters of 
complementary 
assets arise, as 
some knowledge 
cannot be traded on 
factor markets
Case C: positive 
transaction costs, 
blueprint knowledge
TC of enforcing 
discoveries 
negatively 
infl uence OD. Less 
OD than under A
TC reduce value 
creation. Resource 
ownershp and 
vertical integration 
are means of 
appropriation
PD may stem from, e.g., 
sunk cost investments
Firms as 
governance 
structures emerge
Case D: positive 
transaction costs, 
nonblueprint 
knowledge
OD determined 
jointly by TC and 
knowledge
Value creation less 
than under all other 
cases
TC are a source of path-
dependence (sustained 
heterogeneity)
Firm organization 
is chosen to foster 
OD. ‘Speculative’ 
cause of ownership
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heterogeneity stemming from initial knowledge 
endowments or discoveries cannot persist in this 
situation. Moreover, as factor markets perfectly 
refl ect the expected value of resource attributes and 
resource learning (the foundation for the discov-
ery of new attributes), no entrepreneur can consis-
tently outperform the market. Thus, the absence of 
costs or cognitive constraints on the movement of 
resources, including knowledge, limit the causes 
of sustainable heterogeneity and, therefore, differen-
tial rents (Barney, 1991), to initial endowments of 
nonreproducible resources (e.g., location).
Economic organization. As the resource learning 
mechanism and the appropriability mechanisms are 
nullifi ed, the process of resource learning is inde-
pendent of transaction costs, and can be organized 
through market contracts at zero cost. Firms as gov-
ernance structures have no particular advantages 
concerning the organization of resource learning 
processes (Williamson, 1996). Relatedly, the entre-
preneur has no incentive to control a resource or 
resource bundle by means of holding ownership title; 
costless bargaining and contracting over resource 
attributes can substitute for ownership (Hart, 1995). 
Thus, fi rms will not arise as means to secure value 
appropriation (as in Liebeskind, 1996).
Case B: zero transaction costs and 
nonblueprint knowledge
Opportunity discovery. When knowledge is non-
blueprint, entrepreneurs will have less access to 
knowledge than in Case A (Lippman and Rumelt, 
1982). The entrepreneur’s own accumulated expe-
rience is an important antecedent of opportunity 
discovery (Shane, 2000, 2003). The nonblueprint 
nature of knowledge, in this case, is a force limiting 
overall opportunity discovery. However, entrepre-
neurs may gain by developing means of reducing 
buyers’ knowledge requirement. For example, they 
may make knowledge more tradable by embodying 
it in products, equipment, or modular components 
which do not require much knowledge on the part 
of the recipient (Demsetz, 1991). Thus, a conse-
quence of the changing nature of knowledge is that 
the nature of the opportunity discovery process 
changes.
Value creation and appropriation. In terms of 
assumptions made, perhaps Case B best approxi-
mates the RBV (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). While 
the RBV pays little attention to transaction costs, 
differential knowledge resources are central in this 
view. However, the explicit introduction of opportu-
nity discovery, a phenomenon not yet incorporated 
with the RBV, means that strategic challenges go 
beyond those traditionally identifi ed in the RBV. 
Because in this case all transaction costs are zero, 
and property rights can, therefore, be costlessly pro-
tected, threats to value appropriation from imitation, 
opportunistic holdup, and the like are nonexistent. 
As in the RBV entrepreneurs may face potential sub-
stitutability threats. However, with ongoing oppor-
tunity discovery entrepreneurs face the threat of 
total value erosion, as completely different bodies of 
knowledge and complementary resource may serve 
a given market need in a new and very different way. 
This is a serious concern to an entrepreneur, as he/
she cannot insure his/her investments in knowledge 
and complementary assets against such events. No 
insurance markets insure against discoveries that are 
deemed unlikely to succeed by all except a knowl-
edgeable entrepreneur (Knight, 1921). Strategic 
fl exibility becomes important in this case.
Path-dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. 
As in Case A, entrepreneurs may start out with dif-
ferent bundles of resource attributes, which give rise 
to differential accumulation of knowledge. However, 
in a setting in which knowledge is nonblueprint 
(contrary to Case A), resource heterogeneity among 
entrepreneurs may be sustained and perhaps even 
increase. The reason is that an entrepreneur’s prior 
related knowledge provides him/ her with a learn-
ing advantage and possible fi rst-mover advantages 
within the scope of his/ her knowledge domain. 
Thus, the entrepreneur has an incentive to direct 
opportunity discovery efforts in directions that allow 
building on already accumulated knowledge.
Economic organization. At the same time, the 
entrepreneur also faces incentives to set up a produc-
tive operation by contracting with complementary 
resources on a longer-term basis (Alchian, 1984; 
Casson, 1999; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b). This 
makes economic sense to the extent that the idio-
syncratic nature of the knowledge accumulated 
through resource learning processes makes it hard 
to trade on factor markets (Teece, 1982). The entre-
preneur’s opportunity discovery will be infl uenced 
by resource learning stemming from these comple-
mentary resources. As more knowledge specifi c 
to these complementary resources is accumulated, 
the entrepreneur will come to value this particu-
lar bundle of resources higher than entrepreneurs 
who do not posses the resource-specifi c knowledge. 
This may confer a factor market advantage (Barney, 
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1986), as the knowledgeable entrepreneur is able 
to take more resource attributes into account in the 
resource evaluation (Denrell et al., 2003). Heteroge-
neity is sustained because of advantages in opportu-
nity discovery relating to the knowledge resources 
controlled by the entrepreneur.
Case C: positive transaction costs and 
blueprint knowledge
Opportunity discovery. The presence of transaction 
costs switches on the resource learning and appropri-
ability mechanisms (these are not present in cases 
A and B). The presence of transaction costs implies 
that not all opportunities that would be value creat-
ing in cases A and B will be exploited. First, trans-
action costs imply that property rights will be less 
secure and need protection. This negatively infl u-
ences the net value that the entrepreneur expects 
to appropriate (Teece, 1986; Coff, 1997; Shepherd 
and DeTienne, 2005). Thus, if contracts are imper-
fect because of transaction costs, other agents may 
capture parts of the surplus from a discovery. For 
example, a buyer may engage in holdups (Hart, 
1995; Williamson, 1996) involving complementary 
assets that are necessary to the production or mar-
keting of the discovery. Second, the appropriability 
risk from imitation becomes a concern. Third, costs 
of engaging in resource learning also limit the set of 
opportunities relative to cases A and B.
An implication of these points is that it now—in 
contrast to cases A and B—matters which entrepre-
neur (or fi rm) makes a particular discovery (even 
if the knowledge leading to the discovery is fully 
transferable). Some entrepreneurs may face trans-
action costs that other entrepreneurs do not face (to 
the same extent). For example, entrepreneurs may 
face differential abilities to raise capital and access 
complementary resources, or face different costs of 
protecting property rights to discoveries, or they 
may face different costs of resource learning.
Value creation and appropriation. Overall, the 
presence of transaction costs harms value creation 
relative to Case A. This is because transaction costs 
dissipate value (Barzel, 1997) and many discover-
ies will not be made in the presence of transaction 
costs. The presence of transaction costs in itself may 
lead to opportunity discovery as entrepreneurs seek 
to reduce transaction costs to increase the value 
they can appropriate (Coase, 1988; Makowski and 
Ostroy, 2001). However, some transaction costs will 
remain. Whether the presence of transaction costs 
is more harmful to value creation than nonblueprint 
knowledge (i.e., Case B) cannot be established on 
a priori grounds.
The presence of transaction costs has several dis-
tinct strategic implications to fi rms in the context 
of opportunity discovery. First, value appropriation 
depends on the transaction costs fi rms face in delin-
eating and enforcing property rights to resource attri-
butes. Thus, when looking for resource attributes that 
may yield a competitive advantage, entrepreneurial 
fi rms must consider the costs of keeping these attri-
butes rare (and nonimitable), as well as protected 
from other types of value capture (Chi, 1994; Foss 
and Foss, 2005). Second, transaction costs intro-
duce strategic hazards in the form of externalities 
that negatively impact resource values. For example, 
low-quality producers may threaten established high-
quality levels. In this situation, entrepreneurial fi rms 
may become more dependent on complementary 
resources that can credibly signal their intentions 
to important stakeholders (Akerlof, 1970; Klein and 
Leffl er, 1981). Therefore, for entrepreneurial fi rms 
that direct opportunity discovery towards the quality 
dimension, it is a strategic challenge to acquire the 
relevant complementary resources and direct oppor-
tunity discovery toward areas where they can put 
these resources to use.
Path dependence and sustainable heterogeneity. 
In Case C, resource heterogeneity emerges endog-
enously from discovery, but for reasons different 
from those mentioned in Case B. Transaction costs 
make some of the resource attributes discovered by 
entrepreneurs nontradable. Some types of resource 
attributes are less likely to be tradable, such as new 
uses of capabilities, brand name capital, reputation, 
and culture (Dierickx and Cool, 1989); entrepre-
neurs face incentives to utilize these themselves by 
engaging in opportunity discovery in areas related to 
these resources (Denrell et al., 2003). This gives rise 
to path-dependency, ultimately induced by transac-
tion costs (cf. Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999).
Economic organization. In a setting with transac-
tion costs, the process of opportunity discovery will 
be organized in a way that minimizes these costs. 
Transaction costs create incentives for the entrepre-
neur to own resources rather than rely on contrac-
tual delineation and enforcement of property rights 
to newly discovered resource attributes. Resource 
ownership confers a bundle of rights, including 
rights to hitherto undiscovered attributes of the 
relevant resource. An entrepreneur may prefer to 
acquire ownership of a resource rather than acquire 
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a specifi ed, fi nite list of rights to resource attributes. 
This is because resource ownership is a low-cost 
means of allocating the rights to resource attributes 
that are discovered by the entrepreneur/owner. In a 
well-functioning legal system, resource ownership 
usually implies that the courts will not interfere with 
an entrepreneur/owner’s exploitation of new attri-
butes. There is also an incentive effect on oppor-
tunity discovery of resource ownership: ownership 
implies a legally recognized right to the income of 
that resource, including the right to earn income 
from discovered attributes. Moreover, resource own-
ership may economize with costs of enforcing prop-
erty rights, because owning rather than contracting 
over attributes can make imitation of a discovery 
more costly to would-be imitators (cf. Teece, 1986; 
Liebeskind, 1996). These rationales of ownership go 
beyond those discussed in the economics literature 
(e.g., Barzel, 1982, 1997; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 
1995), but make sense in a dynamic economy in the 
context of opportunity discovery.
When an entrepreneur takes ownership of 
resources, this is tantamount to forming a fi rm 
(Knight, 1921; Foss and Klein, 2005). Strictly speak-
ing, however, it need not be the entrepreneur who 
sets up a fi rm or acquires complementary resources 
as, under the assumptions of the present case, the 
entrepreneur’s knowledge may be transferred to 
another entrepreneur, depending on the transaction 
costs of doing this. Conceivably, the entrepreneur 
may face high transaction costs in establishing own-
ership to the preferred bundle of resources and in 
establishing a fi rm governance structure. For this 
reason, the entrepreneur may prefer to transfer the 
relevant knowledge of a discovery to those who have 
lower transaction costs of setting up a fi rm. Transac-
tion costs thus determine the organizational context 
of opportunity discovery, specifi cally whether the 
entrepreneur becomes an employee or an individual 
contractor.
Case D: positive transaction costs and 
nonblueprint knowledge
Opportunity discovery. The fi nal, and most realistic, 
case is the one where both transaction costs and 
differential ability to absorb knowledge are allowed 
to infl uence opportunity discovery. As in Case B, 
fi rms’ discovery activities will be path dependent, 
because of differential accumulation of knowledge 
stemming from the nonblueprint nature of knowl-
edge (Helfat, 1994; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). 
The difference is that the resource learning and the 
appropriability mechanisms now both contribute to 
shaping paths of discovery. Several different scenar-
ios can be conceived depending on how knowledge 
and these two mechanisms together infl uence oppor-
tunity discovery. For example, fi rms may be very 
favorably positioned vis-à-vis opportunity discov-
ery in terms of their control of fi rm-specifi c knowl-
edge resources and learning. However, it may be so 
costly to enforce discoveries (i.e., the appropriability 
mechanism) that advantages are offset. Or, resource 
learning may be so costly (e.g., forging contractual 
links with outside parties to access knowledge is 
very costly) that it swamps benefi ts from the low 
costs of enforcing property rights.
The relative contribution of knowledge and the 
appropriability and resource learning mechanisms 
with respect to shaping opportunity discovery (as 
well as their interaction) requires more analytical 
attention than can be given here. However, what 
infl uences opportunity discovery in actuality is likely 
to be industry specifi c. Evolutionary economists 
and students of technological change (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986; Helfat, 1994; Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996) argue that industry-level technologi-
cal change is shaped by technological opportunities 
and appropriability regimes and their interaction, 
but that these forces differ across industries. Simi-
larly, whether knowledge or the two transaction cost 
mechanisms are the primary antecedents of opportu-
nity discovery is likely to be industry specifi c. For 
example, rather strong intellectual property rights 
protection characterizes the pharmaceutical indus-
try, and this gives the appropriability mechanism 
a form that is different from the form it takes in 
industries with weaker appropriability regimes, such 
as the music industry.
Value creation and appropriation. As fi rms dis-
cover opportunities along paths of discovery that are 
shaped by both fi rm-specifi c knowledge and transac-
tion costs, the resulting heterogeneity in discovery 
may translate into long-lasting differences in appro-
priable value creation across fi rms. What was said 
earlier about value creation and appropriation under 
cases B and C also applies here.
Path dependence and sustainable heterogene-
ity. Transaction costs and differential knowledge 
reinforce one another in the creation of resource 
heterogeneity and path dependency. Prior related 
knowledge directly constrains the learning pro-
cesses, because it directs search and experimenta-
tion in certain directions as well as provides 
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entrepreneurs with certain heuristics for problem 
solving. This will produce sustained heterogene-
ity when knowledge is nonblueprint. The presence 
of transaction costs reinforces such heterogeneity. 
First, as transaction costs make some opportunities 
unattractive (because property rights cannot be suf-
fi ciently enforced), some resource attributes will not 
be explored and entrepreneurs will not build knowl-
edge relative to these. Second, transaction costs and 
knowledge directly interact in shaping the resource 
learning processes. That is, there are knowledge and 
transaction cost implications of organizing resource 
learning processes. Transaction costs exert an infl u-
ence because there are costs of searching for, explor-
ing, accessing, and combining resource attributes to 
try out new combinations (Teece, 1982; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Matsusaka, 2001), and these costs 
constrain resource learning because they constrain 
what resource combinations can be tried, and what 
resource attributes will be examined. An implica-
tion for theory, which so far has been unexamined 
in strategic management, is that transaction costs 
play a key role in the formation and development 
of capabilities.
Economic organization. Transaction costs and 
resource learning interact in providing a rationale 
for ownership and fi rm organization. Entrepre-
neurs have incentives to own resources because 
of the costs of trading accumulated knowledge. 
Moreover, incentives for resource ownership may 
derive from the speculative reason that resource 
ownership confers property rights to discovered 
resource attributes to the resource owner. Firms 
as governance structure emerge in order to reduce 
the costs of protecting against imitation and other 
types of rent capture, such as shirking and holdup 
(Liebeskind, 1996). However, the extent to which 
fi rms are needed in order to protect against imi-
tation differs from Case C. In Case D, entrepre-
neurs have different abilities to absorb knowledge, 
creating a barrier to imitation. Differences among 
entrepreneurs with respect to their knowledge bases 
likewise infl uence their incentives to imitate com-
petitors’ resource bundles, as they do not see the 
same opportunities for discovery of new attributes 
as those who have the relevant knowledge (Denrell 
et al., 2003). Thus, we should expect to see not 
only more sustainable heterogeneity among entre-
preneurs in this setting compared to Case C, but also 
less nonmarket economic organization.
A further rationale for fi rm organization is 
that fi rms emerge as a means of lowering the 
transaction costs involved in resource learning. 
Resource learning may require that the entrepre-
neur enter into collaboration with fi rms who control 
complementary knowledge that is costly to transfer. 
Organizing experimental processes involving com-
bination and recombination of resource attributes 
across markets requires continuous costly renego-
tiation among resource owners. Moreover, asset 
specifi city may arise from such processes, giving 
rise to the familiar holdup problem. Given this, part 
of the rationale of fi rms is that they can organize 
entrepreneurial learning processes in a transaction 
cost minimizing manner (for this argument, see 
Foss, 2001). Thus, contrary to Kirzner (1973), who 
is adamant that entrepreneurship may be exercised 
independently of asset ownership and fi rm organiza-
tion, there is a logical nexus between entrepreneur-
ship, ownership, and fi rms, namely when transaction 
costs are positive.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The key aim of this work has been to defi ne a role 
for transaction costs and property rights along with 
experiential knowledge as antecedents of opportunity 
discovery and sustained advantage. The arguments 
lie in the intersection of the strategic management 
and entrepreneurship fi elds and contribute to both of 
these. In the following, the specifi c contributions to 
the two fi elds are briefl y outlined.
Contribution to the resource-based view
Opportunity discovery, resource learning, and 
transaction costs. Because it is the source of new 
value creation, opportunity discovery seems central 
to strategic management. In general, however, 
opportunity discovery has not been a prominent 
theme in strategic management research (but see Hitt 
et al., 2001; Ireland, Hitt, and Sirmon, 2003). Thus, 
strategic management’s dominant perspective, the 
RBV, still has to fi nd room for opportunity discov-
ery in its theoretical edifi ce (but see Rumelt, 1987; 
Mosakowski, 1998; Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; 
Alvarez and Barney, 2004). Although there may be 
deep reasons why the RBV and the entrepreneur-
ship fi eld have lived somewhat separate lives—such 
as differences in levels of analysis (fi rm versus 
the entrepreneur)—many prominent scholars have 
rightly argued that understanding opportunity 
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discovery is a pressing issue in strategic management 
(e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b; 
Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Denrell et al., 2003).
The present work contributes to overcoming the 
schism in a number of ways. First, in regard to the 
differences concerning levels of analysis, the analy-
sis here suggests that what is the relevant level is 
partially dependent on transaction cost consider-
ations. If such costs are zero, the entrepreneur is 
unambiguously the relevant level, as fi rms will not 
exist. However, to the extent that transaction costs 
cause learning and capabilities to be internalized in 
fi rms, fi rms become the relevant level of analysis 
for opportunity discovery. Second, the article links 
the key entrepreneurship construct of opportunity 
discovery to RBV notions of resource heterogene-
ity and learning. While others have linked opportu-
nity discovery to resource learning (Penrose, 1959; 
Mahoney, 1995; Helfat, 1997; Foss, 2001; Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003; Stieglitz and Heine, 2007) and trans-
action costs to the RBV (e.g., Coff, 1999; Foss and 
Foss, 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2006), the specifi c 
contribution of this work is to introduce transaction 
costs and property rights as important antecedents of 
opportunity discovery in the context of a resource-
based view. Transaction costs moderate the rela-
tion between knowledge and opportunity discovery, 
and they infl uence the costs of engaging in resource 
learning. For this reason, transaction costs matter 
in understanding which resource attributes entre-
preneurial fi rms will explore, and which fi rms will 
explore which resource attributes.
Path dependence and resource endogeneity. 
Transaction costs furthermore matter in understand-
ing how heterogeneous resources emerge from 
resource learning, and how resource heterogeneity 
may be sustained—both key issues in a dynamic 
RBV (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Knowledge-based 
differences among entrepreneurs are likely to create 
long-lasting differences in entrepreneurial discov-
ery activities when knowledge gained from resource 
learning possesses cumulative and path-dependent 
characteristics. This can lead to fi rm-specifi c trajec-
tories of learning that result in continuous identifi -
cation and exploitation of opportunities and are rent 
yielding along the trajectory. Helfat (1994, 1997) 
describes such trajectories for the U.S. petroleum 
industry. Some of the knowledge that underlies a 
path of resource learning is tied to a fi rm-specifi c 
context (Kogut and Zander, 1992), because of the 
high transaction costs for outsiders to access it. 
For example, it has been argued that knowledge 
embedded in capabilities and culture is often costly 
to competitors to access and imitate (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989), and prohibitively costly to trade on 
factors markets. In other words, transaction costs 
may play a key role in the creation of sustained het-
erogeneity and, therefore, sustained advantage.
Contributions to entrepreneurship research
In an infl uential paper, Shane and Venkatara-
man (2000) argued that although entrepreneurship 
provides research questions for many fi elds in 
management, strategy and organization scholars are 
fundamentally concerned with three sets of research 
questions, namely why, when, and how: (1) entre-
preneurial opportunities arise, (2) certain individu-
als and fi rms (and not others) discover and exploit 
opportunities, and (3) different modes of action are 
used to exploit those opportunities (including the 
issue of ‘.  .  .  how the exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities are organized in the economy,’ [Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000: 224]). The distinctive 
contribution of this work is to proffer new answers 
to these important research questions informed by 
the EPR and the RBV.
The emergence of entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties. With respect to the fi rst question of how entre-
preneurial opportunities arise, we have pointed to 
the important role of transaction costs and property 
rights. At a very fundamental level, transaction costs 
are at the heart of entrepreneurship—the presence 
of transaction costs means that there cannot be a 
full set of contingent forward markets, as in the full 
intertemporal general equilibrium model of Debreu 
(1959) (Radner, 1968). The intertemporal coordina-
tion of present resource uses and future consumption 
is undertaken by the entrepreneurial function, that 
is, by engaging in the discovery of intertemporal 
opportunities (Knight, 1921). At a simpler level, 
the reduction of transaction costs may, in itself, 
constitute an entrepreneurial opportunity, as when 
fi rms that come up with new contractual designs, 
new sorting mechanisms, etc., gain an entrepre-
neurial advantage (Makowski and Ostroy, 2001). 
However, a specifi c contribution of this work has 
been to link transaction costs to prior, mainly expe-
riential, knowledge in opportunity discovery. Thus, 
transaction costs matter to opportunity discovery 
because: (1) the experiential outcomes of processes 
of resource learning depend on the transaction costs 
of combining and recombining resource attributes, 
ascertaining the attributes of resources, etc., and, 
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(2) the transaction costs of enforcing property rights 
to discoveries infl uence the direction of search.
The localized nature of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities. Concerning the second research question 
outlined by Shane and Venkatamaran (2000)—why, 
when, and how certain individuals and fi rms (and 
not others) discover and exploit opportunities—this 
work suggests that there is an important transaction 
cost dimension to addressing the question. Tradi-
tionally, the entrepreneurship literature has pointed 
to such things as network position, personality traits, 
and—increasingly—prior experiential knowledge 
as the critical antecedents. The literature on fi rm 
evolution and innovation similarly points to prior 
related knowledge as the critical antecedent. While 
not disagreeing with this view per se, a compre-
hensive understanding of the why, when, and how 
of opportunity discovery must include transaction 
costs, because resource learning and the direction 
of search efforts are fundamentally impacted by 
transaction costs.
Modes of action for exploiting opportunities. 
With respect to the fi nal research question—the why, 
when, and how different modes of action are used to 
exploit opportunities—this work has developed the 
point that the exploitation of opportunities is funda-
mentally dependent on transaction costs. In particu-
lar, fi rms may arise not only for the reasons familiar 
from the organizational economics literature (Hart, 
1995; Williamson, 1996), or to protect against imita-
tion (Liebeskind, 1996), but also because they may 
be superior mechanisms for coordinating resource 
learning processes (Foss, 2001). A specifi c contri-
bution is the argument that resource ownership may 
arise partly for transaction cost reasons and partly 
for speculative reasons: entrepreneurs will assume 
ownership of resources which they expect to be rich 
in hitherto undiscovered, but potentially valuable, 
attributes. This is because contracting over these 
attributes is too costly. This differs from the view 
prevalent in organizational economics, namely that 
ownership is an instrument of bargaining power that 
arises to minimize dissipation of value caused by 
holdup threats (Hart, 1995).
Limitations and future work
As indicated by the example that introduced this 
article, there is an important macroangle into oppor-
tunity discovery and resources: changes in technolo-
gies, institutions, and legal regimes infl uence the 
matrix of property rights and transaction costs that 
fi rms face (Teece, 1986; North, 1990; Williamson, 
1996; Oxley, 1999). Our analysis implies that these 
changes impact opportunity discovery in predictable 
ways and have implications for sustained advantage. 
In this article, we have sidestepped this macroangle 
in order to keep the analytical complexity at a man-
ageable level. However, future work may theorize 
the links from macrochange to opportunity discov-
ery. Empirical work on this may utilize both qualita-
tive as well as event study research methodologies.
Relatedly, there is an important microdimen-
sion that has not been fully explored and devel-
oped. Thus, research indicates that fi rm organization 
impacts entrepreneurship (Miller, 1983). However, 
as we have confl ated the entrepreneur and the fi rm, 
we have not dealt with this issue. Insights on prop-
erty rights and transaction costs would appear to 
be an important part of an inquiry into these issues 
(cf. Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Alvarez and Parker, 
forthcoming). Other microissues that have not been 
dealt with here include the more fi ne grained aspects 
of the appropriability and resource learning mecha-
nisms linking transaction costs and opportunity dis-
covery. What transaction costs are relevant here, 
exactly? How does experiential knowledge interact 
with these mechanisms (cf. Argyres and Mayer, 
2007)? Additional insight into these issues likely 
requires extensive, mainly qualitative, research. The 
aim of this article has been to outline a framework 
for research into how transaction costs and property 
rights impact opportunity discovery and sustainable 
advantage, thereby linking entrepreneurship and 
strategic management research.
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